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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Libel and Slander-Qualified Privilege-Public Proceedings-
Church Meeting.
The defendant newspaper published a report of charges brought
against the plaintiff, a negro minister, before his board of deacons, by
the two defendant members of his congregation, charging him with em-
bezzlement of a charity fund. Judgment for all defendants. Held,
affirmed; the defendant church members were privileged on a show-
ing of good faith and absence of malice, jand the defendant newspaper
was privileged to make a fair and accurate report if the proceedings
had been carried on in a public manner and were legitimately before
the board.1
The law of defamation presents a conflict of two social interests.
On the one hand there is the interest to have the individual secure in
his character and reputation from unwarranted defamatory attacks,
and on the other there is the interest of society that publicity be given
matters of general social concern. The compromise resulting from this
conflict has produced the doctrine of privilege. Privilege is divided
into two general classes: absolute privilege--extended to the utter-
ances of those actually participating in the course of judicial, legislative
and some official procedings ;2 and qualified, or conditional, privileges -
extended to the utterances of those actually participating in the course
of quasi-judicial or public proceedings and reports thereof, and cases
where there is an interest or duty between the parties to the pullication.
Two classes of qualified privilege are involved in the principal case.
'Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F (2d) 742, (App. D. C. 1934). Plaintiff denied the juris-
diction of the board of deacons but failed to prove their lack of jurisdiction at
the trial. Had he been able to do so the occasion would have lost its privilege,
and his subsequent trial and conviction on the charges by the whole church
sitting as a court would have been no defense to the defendant newspaper against
liability for the original publication. Over v. Hildebrand, 92 Ind. 19 (1883);
Fawcett v. Charles, 13 Wend. 473 (N. Y. 1835).2Judicial: Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884) ; Wells
v. Toogood, 165 Mich. 677, 131 N. W. 124 (1911); Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend.
410, 34 Am. Dec. 330 (N. Y. 1839) ; Shelfer v. Gooding, 47 N. C. 175 (1855) ;
Seaman v. Netherclift, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 53 (1876). Legislative: Coffin v. Coffin,
4 Mass. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 189 (1808); Wright v. Lathrop, 149 Mass. 385, 21 N. E.
963 (1889); Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868). Official: Miles v. Mc-
Grath, 4 Fed. Supp. 603 (D. C. Md. 1933) commented on (1934) 12 N. C. L.
Rxv. 170; Layne v. Kirby, (Cal. 1929) 278 Pac. 1046; rev'd 20& Cal. 694, 284
Pac. 441 (1930) first decision commented on (1930) 28 MIcH, L. Rnv. 347;
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: udldicial Proceedings, Legislative
and Executive Proceedings (1909) 9 COL. L. Rzv. 463, (1910), 10 COL. L. Rzv. 131.
1 Qualified or conditional on the publication being made in good faith and
without malice in fact. The usual rule is that a defamatory publication establishes
legal malice. An exception is the defense of qualified privilege in which there
is a presumption of good faith, and the burden of proving actual malice is on
the plaintiff. If malice in fact can be proved, the privilege is destroyed. Coleman
v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908) ; Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.
Y. 488, 90 N. E. 1117 (1910) ; Rosenberg v. Mason, 157 Va. 215, 160 S. E. 190(1931).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
First, the privilege of the defendant church members. Their prob-
lem would appear to be simple and correctly disposed of by the court.
The law is well settled that where there is a sufficient interest or duty
between the communicating. parties, the publication, in the absence of
malice, is a privileged one.4 It is equally well settled that mutual mem-
bership in a church constitutes sufficient interest to justify communica-
tion of matters of and pertaining to the affairs of the church. 5 The
publication here was dearly within this ambit. Churches in this re-
spect are classified with societies and fraternal organizations, to which
the same rule of qualified privileges applies. 6
The second problem, that of the defendant newspaper, is not so sim-
ple. Its privilege, if it has any, must rest on other grounds.7 A news-
paper, as such and in the absence of statute, has no more privilege to
publish libels than anyone else, and like an individual, is restricted to
a fair and accurate report of judicial, legislative, and some official or
public proceedings.8 The primary question, therefore, is whether a
church meeting, as in the instant case, is of such a nature as to come
within the definition of a public proceeding, and if so, whether the pro-
tection of conditional privilege to a fair and accurate newspaper account
is invoked.9
At common law this qualified privilege of publishing reports was
'Smith v. Agee, 178 Ala. 627, 59 So. 647 (1912); Adcock v. Marsh, 30 N. C.
360 (1848) ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249 (1905) ; see Alexander v.
Vann, 180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 36U (1920). Ashcroff v. Hammond, 197 N. Y.
488, 90 N. E. 1117 (1910); Jones, Interest anon Duty in Relation to Qualified
Privilege (1924) 22 MicH. L. Rav. 437.
'Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 Pac. 1050 (1900) ; Farnsworth v. Storrs,
5 Cush. 412 (Mass. 1850); Konkle v. Haven, 140 Mich. 472, 103 N. W. 850
(1905) ; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879) ; Note (1929)
'63 A. L. R. 649.
'Wise v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers, 252 Fed. 961
(C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge & Grand Lodge I. 0. 0. F.,
26 Kan. 384 (1881). For comment on publication in labour organization news-
paper see (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 663.
7 Kimble v. Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N. E. 103 (1908). The privilege
of reporting is distinct from the privilege which attaches to the utterances of
those participating in the proceedings. The latter may be absolute, as in judicial
proceedings, or it may be conditional, as between persons with an interest, but
the privilege of reporting in either case is always a qualified privilege. Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884); Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215
Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913); Rex. v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293 (K. B. 1799).
'Scheckell v. Jackson, 10 Cush. 25 (Mass. 1852); Sweet v. Post Pub. Co.,
215 Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660 (1913); MacAlister v. Detroit Free Press Co.,
76 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 431 (1889) ; Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va.
156, 73 S. E. 472 (1912). For relation of this restriction on newspapers to the
constitutional provision for freedom of the press, see HALE, LAw OF THE PRESS
(2nd. ed. 1933) c. VI, pp. 349 to 369 and cases citedL
'To be privileged the report must be fair and accurate but does not have
to be verbatim so long as it is a fair abstract. Leininger v. New Orleans Item
Pub. Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411 (1924); Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213
Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462 (1908).
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restricted to judicial and legislative proceedings. The courts, perhaps
following the traditional common law policy of protecting individual
rights, have been reluctant to extend its scope to include reports of
public meetings.' 0 In England and other jurisdictions of the British
Empire the extension has been made by statute," but in the United
States, with a few exceptions, neither the courts nor the legislatures have
made this extension.' 2 California and Texas have followed the Eng-
lish example and enacted statutes,'3 and a few states have shown a
tendency to expand the rule by judicial decision. A Massachusetts
court held a report of the activities of a medical society to be of such
public interest as to be deserving of qualified privilege.' 4 The same has
been held respecting a meeting of a city council,15 and a school board.10
Louisiana and Missouri have probably gone furthest by holding the
newspaper accounts of the proceedings of a race track association,17
and of an interview with the Attorney General relative to an official
investigation of a race track' 8 to be conditionally privileged. At least
one court, Vermont, squarely takes the position that church affairs are
of sufficient public interest to vindicate their publication by the press.'0
The importance of the church as a social institution would seem to war-
rant this position, and justify the principal case as a desirable extension
of the common law rule.
FRANKLIN S. CLARK.
Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293 (K. B. 1799); Davidson v. Duncan, 7 El. &
B1. 229 (Q. B. 1857); Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868).
NEWsPAPER LiM AND RIsrRA'ioN Ac, 44 & 45 VicT. c. 60 (1881);
LAw OF LimBi A MNDMENT AcT, 51 & 52 Vier. c. 64 (1888) ; 035ms, LuIDL AND
SLANDRa (6th. ed. 1929) c. XI, p. 252, and Appendix B; NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LimL, (4th. ed. 1924), §§468, 471. Some states have enacted retraction statutes.
North Carolina has held such a statute constitutional. Osborn v. Leach, 135 N1. C.
6£8, 47 S. E. 811 (1904). Contra: Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041
(1904) ; Park v. Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N. W. 731 (1888).
' Kimball v. Post Pub. Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N. E. 103 (1908) ; HALE, LAW
OF THt PRESs (2nd ed. 1933) 153.
" CAL. CIv. CODE (1931) §47 (5); TEx. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5432(3).
"Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 479 (1856).
"Meteye v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 So. 314 (1895);
Leininger v. New Orleans Item Pub. Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411 (1924);
(1925) 23 MicH. L. RZEv. 420; (1925) 19 ILL. L. Rav. 465. Contra: Trebby v.
Transcript P ub. Co., 74 Minn. 84, 76 N. W. 961 (1898); Buckstaff v. Hicks, 94
Wis. 34, 68 N. W. 403 (1896).0 Cafferty v. Southern Tier Pub. Co., 186 App. Div. 136, 173 N. Y. S. 774(1919).
'Rabb v. Trevelyn, 122 La. 174, 47 So. 455 (1908).
ITilles v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 S. W. 1143 (1912).
Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698 (1879), citing: Kelly v.
Shulock and Kelly v. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 699 (1866).
